This special issue of Nuclear Fusion contains 13 informative papers that were initially presented at the 8th IAEA Technical Meeting on Fusion Power Plant Safety held in Vienna, Austria, 10–13 July 2006.Following recommendation from the International Fusion Research Council, the IAEA organizes Technical Meetings on Fusion Safety with the aim to bring together experts to discuss the ongoing work, share new ideas and outline general guidance and recommendations on different issues related to safety and environmental (S&E) aspects of fusion research and power facilities. Previous meetings in this series were held in Vienna, Austria (1980), Ispra, Italy (1983), Culham, UK (1986), Jackson Hole, USA (1989), Toronto, Canada (1993), Naka, Japan (1996) and Cannes, France (2000). The recognized progress in fusion research and technology over the last quarter of a century has boosted the awareness of the potential of fusion to be a practically inexhaustible and clean source of energy.The decision to construct the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) represents a landmark in the path to fusion power engineering. Ongoing activities to license ITER in France look for an adequate balance between technological and scientific deliverables and complying with safety requirements. Actually, this is the first instance of licensing a representative fusion machine, and it will very likely shape the way in which a more common basis for establishing safety standards and policies for licensing future fusion power plants will be developed.Now that ITER licensing activities are underway, it is becoming clear that the international fusion community should strengthen its efforts in the area of designing the next generations of fusion power plants—demonstrational and commercial. Therefore, the 8th IAEA Technical Meeting on Fusion Safety focused on the safety aspects of power facilities. Some ITER-related safety issues were reported and discussed owing to their potential importance for the fusion power plant research programmes.The objective of this Technical Meeting was to examine in an integrated way all the safety aspects anticipated to be relevant to the first fusion power plant prototype expected to become operational by the middle of the century, leading to the first generation of economically viable fusion power plants with attractive S&E features.After screening by guest editors and consideration by referees, 13 (out of 28) papers were accepted for publication. They are devoted to the following safety topics:power plant safety;fusion specific operational safety approaches;test blanket modules;accident analysis;tritium safety and inventories;decommissioning and waste.The paper `Main safety issues at the transition from ITER to fusion power plants' by W. Gulden et al (EU) highlights the differences between ITER and future fusion power plants with magnetic confinement (off-site dose acceptance criteria, consequences of accidents inside and outside the design basis, occupational radiation exposure, and waste management, including recycling and/or final disposal in repositories) on the basis of the most recent European fusion power plant conceptual study.Ongoing S&E studies within the US inertial fusion energy (IFE) community are focusing on two design concepts. These are the high average power laser (HAPL) programme for development of a dry-wall, laser-driven IFE power plant, and the Z-pinch IFE programme for the production of an economically-attractive power plant using high-yield Z-pinch-driven targets. The main safety issues related to these programmes are reviewed in the paper `Status of IFE safety and environmental activities in the US' by S. Reyes et al (USA). The authors propose future directions of research in the IFE S&E area.In the paper `Recent accomplishments and future directions in the US Fusion Safety & Environmental Program' D. Petti et al (USA) state that the US fusion programme has long recognized that the S&E potential of fusion can be attained by prudent materials selection, judicious design choices, and integration of safety requirements into the design of the facility. To achieve this goal, S&E research is focused on understanding the behaviour of the largest sources of radioactive and hazardous materials in a fusion facility, understanding how energy sources in a fusion facility could mobilize those materials, developing integrated state-of-the-art S&E computer codes and risk tools for safety assessment, and evaluating and improving fusion facility design in terms of accident safety, worker safety, and waste disposal.There are three papers considering safety issues of the test blanket modules (TBM) producing tritium to be installed in ITER. These modules represent different concepts of demonstration fusion power facilities (DEMO). L. Boccaccini et al (Germany) analyses the possibility of jeopardizing the ITER safety under specific accidents in the European helium-cooled pebble-bed TBM, e.g. pressurization of the vacuum vessel (VV), hydrogen production from the Be-steam reaction, the possible interconnection between the port cell and VV causing air ingress. Safety analysis is also presented for Chinese TBM with a helium-cooled solid breeder to be tested in ITER by Z. Chen et al (China). Radiological inventories, afterheat, waste disposal ratings, electromagnetic characteristics, LOCA and tritium safety management are considered. An overview of a preliminary safety analysis performed for a US proposed TBM is presented by B. Merrill et al (USA). This DEMO relevant dual coolant liquid lead–lithium TBM has been explored both in the USA and EU.T. Pinna et al (Italy) summarize the six-year development of a failure rate database for fusion specific components on the basis of data coming from operating experience gained in various fusion laboratories. The activity began in 2001 with the study of the Joint European Torus vacuum and active gas handling systems. Two years later the neutral beam injectors and the power supply systems were considered. This year the ion cyclotron resonant heating system is under evaluation.I. Cristescu et al (Germany) present the paper `Tritium inventories and tritium safety design principles for the fuel cycle of ITER'. She and her colleagues developed the dynamic mathematical model (TRIMO) for tritium inventory evaluation within each system of the ITER fuel cycle in various operational scenarios. TRIMO is used as a tool for trade-off studies within the fuel cycle systems with the final goal of global tritium inventory minimization.M. Matsuyama et al (Japan) describes a new technique for in situ quantitative measurements of high-level tritium inventory and its distribution in the VV and tritium systems of ITER and future fusion reactors. This technique is based on utilization of x-rays induced by beta-rays emitting from tritium species. It was applied to three physical states of high-level tritium: to gaseous, aqueous and solid tritium retained on/in various materials.Finally, there are four papers devoted to safety issues in fusion reactor decommissioning and waste management. A paper by R. Pampin et al (UK) provides the revised radioactive waste analysis of two models in the PPCS. Another paper by M. Zucchetti (Italy), S.A. Bartenev (Russia) et al describes a radiochemical extraction technology for purification of V-Cr-Ti alloy components from activation products to the dose rate of 10 µSv/h allowing their clearance or hands-on recycling which has been developed and tested in laboratory stationary conditions. L. El-Guebaly (USA) and her colleagues submitted two papers. In the first paper she optimistically considers the possibility of replacing the disposal of fusion power reactor waste with recycling and clearance. Her second paper considers the implications of new clearance guidelines for nuclear applications, particularly for slightly irradiated fusion materials.